

## I Mil. C-E objectives

4. c To develop & maintain C & C, and comm. systems which are continuously operational (online)

C-E system, reliable, secure, and survivable

### Guiding Principles

~~Systems & facilities must be responsive to the~~  
C-E requirements of originating in the chain of military command [national] that are associated with the rapid, selective, flexible, and enduring control of military forces.

6. C-E design, planning, engineering & construction efforts will be based on a full consideration of possible political, military and national influences of a destructive or disruptive nature and possible even exploitation of electromagnetic radiation of friendly forces.

friendly forces.

29

[INFO; SENSORS; DOYS-ALRM; COMM WITH ENEMY;

- C-E
9. C-E systems must be provided which will ensure continuity of operations and facilitate succession of command for those command elements and communication facilities that are estimated to be primary targets in a limited or general war.

[CP's?]

random operation techniques [?]

15. Plans must provide for survivable emergency comm systems which will provide minimum essential channels for C+C.

CW

14. Maximum advantage will be taken of new techniques affording survivability of communications through hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersal, alternate routing and multiple means to ensure maintenance of capability to control the military

Power of the U.S.

political and military direction.

responsibility to U.S. 28

[!]

2. To assist in developing a climate of  
opinion abroad which will permit the US  
to operate its military forces where and when  
required.

Task III: Short or execution of controlled, deliberate  
attacks.

11. Nuclear Reserve. The retention of, or the capability  
to reconstitute quickly, a reserve is an  
indispensable requirement, for all types of warfare  
and is particularly significant in general war. [1]

Within current capabilities, the requirement for a  
nuclear reserve can be fulfilled to a degree by:

a. Nuclear capable forces not presently committed to  
initial strikes: e.g. those aircraft carriers, SAC  
command support [?] and training unit aircraft  
and the forces not committed to the STOP or initial  
conventional war phase.

b. Continued improvements in planning for use of  
surviving forces in follow-on and "on-call" roles  
against targets, as required.

c. Recognizing that substantial elements of forces committed to the initial attacks will survive and be available for subsequent strikes and as such can be considered as an integral element of the required reserve.

S10P: Provides for optimum integration of committed forces of the CINCS and for coordination with approx. external commands, for all preplanned attacks on selected targets DGZ's & weight of effort.

5c. Any conflicts which arise in force programming of S10P forces for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option IV. [?]

VLS responsibility Program manual guidance for S10P

Program manual to the VLS S10P, p. 10, 11.

JSCP

30. It is recognized that present, in land zones  
the land capabilities are required to support  
sustained major non-nuclear operations.

Continuing efforts will be placed on enhancing logistics  
capabilities to conduct sustained nonnuclear oper-  
ations.

LOW Ops

36. Should LOW involving the US occur, the US will:

1) Permit conflict & efforts to repel the aggression:

2) Be prepared to shift or expand the area of conflict  
in such a way so that US & Allied strengths can be  
more effectively <sup>applied</sup> employed. [?]

3) Exploit opportunities to liberate peoples

territories previously lost through aggression [?]

4) Fight in concert with others, or independently, if necessary

5) Limit damage within the area of conflict, consistent  
with the achievement of military objectives.

17. Plans for employment of non-SIOP forces, to the extent possible, will be based upon the same degree of responsive selectivity as applicable to SIOP forces, be related to the attack options of the SIOP, <sup>will</sup> & be complementary to SIOP ~~plans~~.

... ops by C.W.C. may take the form of defensive  
[?] ops for an extensive period of time followed by  
offensive ops, or early offensive ops in the event of  
a pre-emptive attack. Therefore, for G.W. Planning  
purposes, ops could fall into one of two broad  
categories: i. defensive ops in the event of initiation of  
G.W. under conditions of tactical warning. only [I? II? III?]  
or offensive ops at an early time in the event of  
pre-emptive strikes in accordance with Attack & Defence  
I + II.

ELR.

Prepare plan to assist any revolutionary outbreak that may occur in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania. Planning should be made for the following military actions:

- 1) Logistics support.
- 2) Deployment of Special Forces to assist with revolutionary forces.
- 3) Propaganda etc.
- 4) Direct military intervention by US military forces. Take into account two situations: 1) where US forces are not directly engaged, at least they are serious of Albania. Planning action to encourage them against to intervene in Poland.

## 12. Controlled flexibility of response

5. Below are listed <sup>(2)</sup> currently available courses of action, the implementation of which will provide a greater degree of control. It has recognized that these possible courses of action could be significantly affected by the precision and completeness of our information on enemy strengths. Accordingly, commanders will include in their plans a concise statement of the risks inherent in their implementation. These courses of action, designed to minimize destruction not directly associated with a specific attack include:

- 1) Withholding all attacks on certain countries.
- 2) Attacking a restricted category of targets in certain countries, e.g. neutralization of air defenses.
- 3) Limitation of delivery systems used on targets in attacked areas, e.g. manned aircraft against targets requiring precise delivery and missiles on targets requiring less precision.

19. Plans of CINCS, including 70-63, will ensure that all aspects of current flexibility and selectivity are clearly & specifically contemplated in plans and provided for in preplanned execution.

x Orders and messages.

GW 3b2

24. The will consist of a combination of nuclear & non-nuclear action with the initial emphasis on employment of nuclear weapons to accomplish the stated objective.

The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons is that the US must emerge from initial nuclear ops with a clear military advantage. This advantage may well include the planned removal in certain

areas of the E. E. P. [?] of known dissident peoples who can disrupt, on a continuing basis, the enemy's war area.

Offensive ops created by initial nuclear operations will be exploited. Offensive defenses to exploit the strategic advantages gained by the nuclear ops and to bring the war to a successful conclusion for the US.

182	0	R	2
2151	5101	13	3230

Memorandum for the President

Re: 055-05004 Subject: National Defense Agency  
Estimated US: 12,000,000, 0.3

War Potential of the US

1. Manpower. The availability of US manpower for military operations would be substantially reduced by the resultant casualties and need for emergency civil defense recovery operations.

An estimated 10-20 million persons may be required to perform emergency rehabilitation work. However, such requirement would not compromise since military operations and their support. It is possible that

as many as 42,000,000 persons may be killed and 12,000,000 injured. If so, restrictions would be imposed on the front strength of the Armed forces and military

and physical standards for acceptance into the Armed forces would probably be reduced. Stringent

manpower controls & restrictions in civilian economy to the maximum essential extent would be imposed. The timing of US deployment would be delayed.

Komen:

22

Relatively small intell. analysis of threat  
to NATO Europe. In. Review study of perf. in  
inter what could be brought to bear: 55 divs  
in Central Front. But now: sharp drop in 50  
(S. estimates)

Tactical air strength

Chief obstacle to conventional buildup of  
NATO is still widespread European feeling  
that SO conventional superiority is too great to cope  
with, even defensively. (NATO estimates may contribute  
by overstating threat).

we have good intell. on SO front missile sites  
(i.e. short-range; smaller SO inventory than NATO's).  
But don't have very reliable int. on short-range  
mobile missiles [mobile so they can be kept in SO  
until needed].

In contrast to S.S. 1961 est., SO now projects  
why should keep in SO tactical air strength though

67

National capability to maintain the projected mobilization schedule would be severely impaired. It is estimated that a major limiting factor on our capability to recover from a nuclear attack would be the shortage of effective manpower.

Production facilities would suffer severe damage. C. Production bases. Military production would be at relatively low levels for the first several months after the nuclear exchange. The primary efforts will be directed toward producing relatively simple parts and components essential to sustained and continuing combat operations.

D. Allied Forces Facilities. No attempt has been made to estimate the effects of nuclear attack against our Allied military forces would receive the same degree of damage as comparable US forces in the same area. An attack on US Armed Forces facilities overseas would divert a portion of the effort to that end, which, in turn, would be directed against the US.

portion of the effort to that end, which, in turn, would be directed against the US.

would be directed against the US.

and have both a "deterrent and a war-winning capability."

Various take hours or days to get in position, whereas "the requirement is for immediate attacks at H-hour to minimize damage to the US. Forces which are not in launch position would appear to make a questionable contribution in initial and decisive operations."

[COERCION]

USAF provides info to commands and planning guidance to Services.

Program guidance .... objective force levels considered necessary to support US military strategy.

Military engagement in [NATO] area contains the inherent risk of action and counteraction quickly involving general war.

General war cannot be excluded as the outcome of a local crisis in which both sides become progressively committed or in which a miscalculation by either side occurred. [Would objectives of US or SU be the same in this case as in a 'deliberate, cold-blooded attack'?] Any event, once the Soviets decide on general war, they will themselves seek to initiate it by surprise nuclear attack on the US. [DEF. of General War?]

They must design their initial attack so as to eliminate or reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation which could be launched by Western forces and so as to emerge with military superiority with which to pursue their objectives of world domination.

[US objectives: guarantee to protect its interests]

CND: <sup>to [nuclear retaliating forces]</sup> boom aspect of overlapping deterrence into field of limited aggression will shrink.

AF: Must be able to destroy delivery cap., control mechanisms and supporting resources... strategic advantage... must have both a "deterrent and a war-winning capability."

... carries take hours or days to get in position, whereas "the requirement is for immediate attacks at 4-hour to minimize damage to the US. Forces which are not in launch position would appear to make a questionable contribution in initial and decisive operations."

### [COERCION]

USOP provides info to commands and planning guidance to Services.

Program guidance... objective force levels considered necessary to support US military strategy.

Def. of  
GW?

Military engagement in [NATO] area contains the inherent risk of actions and counteraction quickly involving general war.

... General war cannot be excluded as the outcome of a local crisis in which both sides become progressively committed or in which a miscalculation by either side occurred. [Would signature of US or SU be the crime in this case as in a 'deliberate, cold-blooded attack'?] Many would, once the Soviets decide on general war, they will themselves seek to initiate it by surprise nuclear attack on the US. [DEF. of General War?]

They must design their initial attack so as to eliminate or

clearly prepared to win either general or limited war.

... To convince nations & peoples of the world that US has the capability & will to use its armed forces in whatever form is necessary to make the use of force by the Com Bloc on unacceptable course of action.

LW: To deal swiftly and effectively with any limited war in a manner and on a scale best calculated to bring the LW to a conclusion satisfactory to the US and, consistent with the foregoing, to prevent the hostilities from broadening into <sup>big nuclear</sup> general war.

GW: The military objective of the US for GW [NOT DEFINED] is to defeat the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This includes:

a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability [possible?] to continue the war [BNSP: to wage war] against the US and its Allies.

b) Providing for the defense of the US and other vital areas.  
[for BNSP?]

c) Preserving<sup>?</sup> and retaining as many of its effective allies as possible.

d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to ensure as a free nation and pursue US national objectives. [WHICH ARE?]

[Don't fail to look at consequences of strategy for fear of "weakening resolve," "lowering objectives"; must look at consequences of the chosen strategy.]

Many offer desirable hope of achieving objectives such as prevailing, limiting damage, etc., when other strategies offer no such hope. Note that, just as US security is not the negative of SU security, US ability to prevail is not just the ability to prevent the SU from prevailing; concentration on last objective is not the best path to achieving the first. Many strategies might result in neither sides' prevailing, not because of "stalemate" but because of neither survivors.]

Appropriate nuclear delivery forces will be designed to -  
 attack an optimum-mix target system (the NSIC) as a  
essential national task to be accomplished under the <sup>[immediately]</sup> [i.e. as soon as possible]  
several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

Specific objectives are:

- 2) Destroy or neutralize the S-S Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and governmental controls of major importance.
- 3) Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the S-S Bloc to achieve the general level of destruction indicated in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy.

Coastal Annex C. It is possible that as many as 434 may be killed and an additional 124 injured. If so, some restriction may be imposed on the peak strength of the armed forces during later operations without reducing mental and physical standards for acceptance into the armed forces.

... a major factor limiting our ability to remove reservoirs from  
consideration would be the disturbance and alteration of ecosystems.

(10)

during a period of relative calm. The onset of a GW ~~will~~ probably will be characterized by an intense exchange of nuclear blows and the initiation of further operations and deployment by Army, Naval & Air Forces. The US will maintain a capability to accomplish its GW objectives regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated.

[Makes a difference what GW objectives are; destroy SC ability to wage war, or to continue war.]

During the initial operations the US will minimize loss and damage to the US and its Allies and will inflict in turn, maximum loss and damage on the enemy in order to either (a) bring about his capitulation, or (b) provide a residual margin of advantage to the US and its Allies.

[no longer: "sufficient to ensure victory"] The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons is that the US must emerge from the exchange [no longer: the initial exchange] with the greatest possible over-all advantage.

[The ~~modern~~ coming survivability of control and of weapons and selectivity creates possibilities for strategy not previously feasible: e.g. threats based on withheld forces] [These may, in some cases, be competitive with strategies directly attacking capabilities, ignoring effects on "will" or "intention"; but in other cases, such strategies

[To influence wartime situation, Pres. must: (1) influence the set of contingency plans available, postural flexibility, warning-and-info system: (2) plan above and below the decision level: (3) remain inflexible at

|| must have plan for initiating hostilities: (4) must have decision influences below.

Strat. Concept:

Objective of US and Allies is to promote the overall strength and unity of the Free World and to deter the S-S Bloc from the use of armed force.

[And to limit or improve the consequences to the US of an SU use of armed force. And to make unilateral use less likely, and less destabilizing.]

convince Allies that US strategy & policy serve their security interests

[And convince SU that not attacking US will <sup>unadvised US action</sup> serve its security interests; reduce chance of accidents, US false alarm, SU false alarm - e.g. based on US alerting procedures]

~~Reactor~~

GW (not defined):

US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President, for example, in response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment. [Not in SNSP]  
However, US national policy precludes the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war.

[Pres. should have a variety of actions available to respond to knowledge that an enemy attack is imminent or that a major nuclear assault is underway. These should include plans for a US initiative attack: designed to exploit circumstances in terms of US objectives. Also, possibilities for decent, alternatives.]

[Discharge SO from thinking pre-emptive attack preferable:  
reduce chance of <sup>SO</sup> false alarm, <sup>(ambiguous US alerting message)</sup> SO fear of US false alarm or  
US unauthorized action; and advantage of pre-emptive attack  
(US initiative might avoid SO cities; US retaliation much less  
likely to).

morality?

[AF claims: Delete "SO will". "Military objective is to  
destroy enemy capability to wage war. [NO. 'Since when?'  
Work on will, mainly through effect on capability; to carry  
war past point where enemy has lost his will to resist — further  
to destroy his capability — may compromise other US objectives.]

"The destruction of his will is in the political and psychological  
fields and goes beyond the military strategy required to win a  
war." [H/O; "winning" often impossible unless strategy  
designed to affect enemy will] (Not bought)

[Cannot hope, under all circumstances, to achieve US  
objectives by destroying enemy capability to inflict damage.  
The fact that "deterrence" has failed does not mean that  
no further failures are possible.]

[Morality? : ~~Instead of: "Hypothesis"~~

say: "~~Substantive? command will be exercised~~ <sup>not</sup>  
when required in defense of their command."

Instead of: "However, designated command will be  
preferred...."

Initial independent phase deleted

Exploitation forces

will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like DNDP: to wage war]

- a) Defending the US and other vital areas.
- c) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.
- d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.
- e) Concluding ~~objection~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US & Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTE: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GW as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SU — though this is not what AF had in mind.]

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other targets that constitute an immediate threat to friendly forces in that area. Situations may occur in which authorization for the use of nuclear weapons will be delayed. There will be other contingencies which do not warrant the use

GW: Military objective of the US for general war, a war with the USSR, [not a NSOP: disagreement over role of China in 1965], is to defeat the Soviet Bloc.

This includes:

a) Reducing by military action the capabilities of the USSR and Comm. China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to continue the war against the US and its Allies. [not like NSOP: to wage war]

b) Defending the US and other vital areas.

c) Preserving and retaining as many of its Allies as possible.

d) Achieving a residual power relationship with other nations sufficient to survive as a free nation and pursue US national objectives.

e) Concluding ~~objections~~ hostilities with a military position favorable to the success of the US & Allied post-war objectives.

[NOTE: all of this is consistent with an interpretation of GW as war with USSR, in which both US and USSR had limited objectives; war ends without total defeat & surrender of SU — though this is not what AF had in mind.]

CW: Nuclear weapons will be used in CW when authorized by the President. Nuclear ops will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of hostilities and against other targets that constitute a threat to the US.

10  
policy of the US and others

Translate national:

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified & spec. commands for the conduct of ops in cold, limited and general war.  
[Abandon this triadology]

Provide strategic & logistic planning guidance ....

To military services for disposition, employment & support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since CP related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical: for 1965.

[How well do actual capabilities permit US to achieve objectives? Hence, how important to change capabilities: e.g. C+C Cops?]

→ Def of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.")

[i.e. Who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

of military objectives, strategic concepts and tasks which are in consonance with actual US military capabilities.

Constitute a directive to commanders of the unified & specified commands for the conduct of ops in total, limited and general.  
[Abandon this triadology]

Provide strategic & logistical planning guidance...

In military doctrine for disposition, employment & support of US military forces in the conduct of ops, and

[Since CP related to actual current capabilities, curious that OP is identical: for 1965.

[How well do actual capabilities permit US to achieve objectives? Hence, how important to change capabilities: e.g. CVC cap]

Def of S-S Bloc (includes "such other countries as may be determined to be dominated by International Communism.")

[i.e. who is the enemy in GW? Not in BNSP or OP]

GW: like OP, but without phrase "consistent with the foregoing"

GW: like OP (unlike BNSP): "to continue the war"

of military weapons. Plans will be formulated accordingly. The JCS will, at the time of authorization, provide additional guidance, as required, for the use of nuclear weapons.

GW. US national policy precludes preventive war. GW, though not considered likely, might result from hostilities short of GW which were not initially intended by either side to lead to GW [i.e. war with USSR?], or might be initiated by the Soviets with little or no warning. In response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, the US forces may be required to take the initiative, if so directed by the President.

..... Offensive opportunities created by the initial exchange will be exploited. Offensive + defensive employment of joint and combined military forces, and recovery and reconstitution of forces and the logistics base will be accorded to exploit the strategic advantage gained by the nuclear exchange and to minimize any gains which may have been made by the Soviets. No attempt is made to prejudge the length of a nuclear war.

1. Army - Navy and 1. expand the "exploitation" phase

[any?]

The US, under conditions of general war, will remain  
[not "probably"] in initial nuclear strategy attack against  
optimum-size target system (the VSTC), as an essential out-  
task to be accomplished under the several conditions in  
which hostilities may be initiated.

[Tasks now included in NSOP also]

M- M+G expansion: during limited war or prior to a GW.

a) Plans will stipulate that nuclear weapons will be used as  
[under?] authorized by the Pres.

b) CW plans should include appropriate provisions for partial  
implementation [No nuclear?] in the event such action becomes  
necessary --

c) War plans will be executed when directed by the JCS. [Pres?]  
Implementing messages will specifically designate those nations  
against which operations are to be conducted.

K

~~Deterrence of aggression~~

Finite deterrence is a bet — a bet that deterrence won't fail.  
Thought of as reducing chance of failure to zero. But if it does  
fail, everything is lost. Russian roulette.

US should employ its strategic capabilities as... a means of  
protecting rather than destroying the nation's vital interests  
in the event that deterrence should fail.

[Is there a policy that guarantees that deterrence will not  
fail and that other US interests will be secure? If so, take it.]

Though O-I destroy war-supporting resources, SO might figure that  
significant residual of force would enable them to take over  
industry + econ. of neighboring countries to re-establish it.

(Machauelli: ~~him~~ Men, Iron, Gold & Bread.)

Might predict eventual victory. Hence, deterrent effect of required  
forces not sufficient. (Though "would later S-S bloc...  
unless they estimated that no other course of action would  
permit ~~their~~ attainment of their objectives.

[Also, blackmail]

Also, couldn't be defended or to prevent SO force from  
inflicting unacceptable damage to US. [Can O-I?]

if their survival or continued progress were threatened and  
if their military residual would permit them to prevail in  
spite of devastation of SS industry & economy. [Mach...]